LE OPINIONI


Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).

A trial court judge imposed the death penalty on respondent Summerlin for the first degree murder and sexual assault of a Finance America Bank employee. The victim had been at the respondent’s home discussing an outstanding debt, and was found by the respondent’s mother-in-law in the trunk of her car the following morning. The trial judge was permitted to impose the death penalty, under Arizona state law, if he could find at least one of several aggravating factors that are enumerated in that statute. The trial court judge found two aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, and thereby imposed the death penalty.

During the time that the respondent’s case was on review, the Supreme Court decided two cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona. Apprendi requires that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ring applied this decision to the Arizona statute at hand and found that since the Arizona sentencing scheme requires that aggravating factors be found in order to impose the death penalty, these factors must be found by a jury, rather than by a judge.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the respondent’s death sentence and rejected the argument that Ring should not apply because the respondent’s sentence had become final upon direct review before Ring was decided.

On appeal Scalia, writing for the Court, held that while new substantive rules do apply to prior cases, new procedural rules do not apply retroactively. This is because procedural rules do not produce the same “direct connection to innocence” that substantive rules do. Because this new rule from Ring that allocates the decisionmaking power to a jury, rather than to a judge, is procedural, it does not apply retroactively to cases that are already final on direct review. The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further review consistent with this opinion.


Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 124 S. Ct. 1920 (2004).

Respondent, a Texas partnership, filed a breach of contract claim against petitioner, a Mexican corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The jury found for the respondent. However, before judgment was entered, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This motion alleged that several partners in the respondent’s partnership were Mexican citizens at the time of filing, and therefore had a lack of diversity. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion, and the respondent appealed.

On appeal, the respondent argued that the Fifth Circuit should ignore the fact that diversity failed to exist at the time of filing because the Mexican partners left the partnership before the trial began, thereby establishing the required diversity. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the respondent and held that diversity must be established at the time of filing, except where, as in this case, the jurisdictional defect is cured before it is identified.

The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and reaffirmed its longstanding position on the issue. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, quoted Conolly v. Taylor, 7 L. Ed. 518, which states that "[w]here there is no change of party, a jurisdiction depending on the condition of the party is governed by that condition as it was at the commencement of the suit." Scalia opined that the Court must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as there was no diversity jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced.


Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-4 court, held that Washington State’s sentencing procedure did not afford the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury because it allowed judges to increase the plea bargain sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the finding of aggravating circumstances that are proven beyond a preponderance of the evidence.

At the trial court level, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping, and under the sentencing guidelines, was subject to forty-nine to fifty-three months in prison. Under the Washington State sentencing scheme, the judge was permitted to add up to ten years to the sentence based on aggravating circumstances. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to ninety months in prison based on a finding of deliberate cruelty. The Supreme Court held that in order for a court to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, the aggravating circumstances must be considered by a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.


Engine Manufacturer’s Association v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 124 S. Ct. 1756 (2004).

The South Coast Air Quality Management District is responsible for regulating air emissions in and around Los Angeles, California. The District promulgated several rules that prohibited the purchase or lease of vehicles that did not comply with stringent emission requirements. Petitioners sued the District alleging that Section 209 of the Clean Air Act preempted the District rules. Section 209 prohibits the “adoption or attempted enforcement of any state or local standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”

The Supreme Court held that “standard,” according to the plain meaning of the word, is a model, example, criterion, or test. The Court reaffirmed the long held rule that in order to discern legislative purpose, one must look to the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. The Court found that there are no exceptions in Section 209 for standards imposed through purchase requirements. The Court’s use of the plain meaning of “standard” was held to be consistent with the use of “standard” in Section 209 of the Clean Air Act; therefore, the District’s rules should be preempted by Section 209. The Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.